GAYANASHOGOWA AND GUARDIANSHIP: EXPANDING AND
CLARIFYING THE FEDERAL-TRIBAL TRUST RELATIONSHIP
KAVITHA JANARDHAN
Abstract: The Onondaga Nation of New York seeks to nullify a
series of treaties executed by the State of New York, and thereby
assert title to over 3100 square miles of land in Central New York
State. The goal of the suit is to enforce an environmental restoration
of culturally and historically significant aboriginal lands. In order to
bring a claim against the State, the Nation must first compel the
federal government to act on its behalf. By emphasizing distinctive
features of Iroquois self-government, the following Note suggests
ways to expand the federal government’s trust responsibility to
protect cultural interests in land against state intrusion. To do so,
this Note explores the complex tension between Euro-American
conceptions of governance and the Native American, particularly
Iroquois, law of Gayanashogowa, or the Great Law of Peace.
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INTRODUCTION
In March of 2005, the Onondaga Nation, a member of the Six
Nations Iroquois or Haudenosaunee Confederacy, filed a complaint
in federal district court seeking legal recognition of its title to 3,100
square miles of land in the State of New York.1 Like other Native
American land claims before it, the Onondaga suit asserts that a
series of treaties conveying land to the State of New York were
unlawfully executed, and are therefore void.2 In order to redress
over 200 years of spiritual, cultural and emotional harm, the
Onondaga request a declaratory judgment stating that its members
are the rightful owners of the lands at issue, which roughly center on
the City of Syracuse.3 The Nation alleges that all treaties held by
the State are in violation of the federal Indian Trade and Intercourse
Act,4 the United States Constitution,5 the Treaty of Fort Stanwix,6
and the Treaty of Canandaigua.7 Additionally, the Onondaga call for
the federal government to file an identical suit against the State of
New York, a duty which comports with the government’s trust
obligation.8

1 Complaint at 1-2,14, Onondaga Nation v. New York, et al., (N.D.N.Y. March 11,
2005); Indian Law Resource Center:
Onondaga Nation Land Claim 2005,
http://www.indianlaw.org/onondaga.html.
2 Indian Law Resource Center, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1790).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6 The Treaty of Fort Stanwix was signed in October of 1784. Characterized as a
inauspicious beginning to federal/tribal relations, the Treaty granted land cessions and six
prisoners to the United States government following the Revolutionary War, in return for
promises of peace and protection. Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The
History of a Political Anomaly 45-48 (University of California Press 1994).
7 Complaint,supra note 1, at 13; Prucha, supra note 6, at 94-96. This Note will not
discuss the Treaty of Canandaigua nor the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (above). Under
Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), the Supreme
Court held that (1) both treaties only applied to reservation lands and (2) that the Treaty
of Canandaigua only applied to federal relations with the Seneca Indians, the tribe who
signed the treaty. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, New York, 414 U.S. 661, found that the case did not rest on treaty rights but
rather the validity of land transfers to the State of New York. Prucha,supra note 6, at 39295.
8 Complaint, supra note 1, at 4 (the United States has previously intervened or filed
suits against the State of New York on behalf of the Seneca, Cayuga, Mohawk, and
Oneida Nations).
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Though the law suit is, in many respects, similar to other Native
American land claims,9 the Onondaga’s pursuit of justice does not
seek immediate monetary relief or gaming rights.10 Instead, the
Nation raises concerns about environmental damage imposed on its
ancestral land by current occupants.11 In doing so, the Onondaga
contest the use of Western norms in evaluating the extent of harm it
seeks to redress.12 Members of the Onondaga Nation claim that
the environmental degradation caused by private parties has
disrupted their cultural and spiritual connection to their native land,
thereby interfering with their system of government. 13 As such, this
law suit calls for a recognition of and respect for Native American
conceptions of property and governance traditions which have
been disregarded in favor of Western theoretical and common-law
constructions. 14
The Onondaga brings its claim as a plea for justice, seeking a
declaration that its relationship with its native land “goes far beyond
federal and state legal conceptions of ownership, possession, or
other legal rights.”15 On one hand, this assertion suggests a
necessary shift in our inquiry into Native American land claims: it
asks us to examine, from an indigenous perspective, the true
intentions of tribes regarding early federal land transactions.16 More
importantly, the Onondaga suit serves as an opportunity to rethink
what constitutes “justice” for Native American tribes seeking
retribution for environmental harm to culturally significant lands.17
This Note contends that, after over 200 years of dispossession,
“justice” may be achieved by first recognizing Native American
conceptions of property, and then incorporating indigenous beliefs
into the existing trust relationship between the federal government
and Native American tribes. As a historical/legal study, this Note
explores the complex tension between two systems of property in
9 The legal arguments made by the Onondaga mirror those made by the Oneida
Nation in County of Oneida v. Oneida Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). See infra pp. 22-23.
10 Kirk Semple, Tribe Lays Claim to 3,100 Square Miles of New York State, N.Y.
TIMES Mar. 12, 2005, available at www.nytimes.com.
11 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-3.
12 See id. at 1-2.
13 See id. at 1-6.
14 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2.
15 Id.
16 See id.
17 See id. (“[T]he Onondaga people wish to bring about healing between themselves
and all others who live in this region that has been the homeland of the Onondaga Nation
since the dawn of time.”).
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North America the Native American, namely Iroquois, conception
of Gayanashogowa and the American legal framework for property
ownership and the effect of this tension on federal-tribal relations.
In doing so, this Note will highlight the role of the federal government
in promoting a cross-cultural approach to Native American
relations a trust relationship directed towards protecting the
realities and needs of its beneficiaries.
In order to provide context for examining these issues, Part I of
this Note discusses elements of the Onondaga claim in detail: the
significant parties involved, the cultural significance of the land at
issue, and the legal arguments set forth by the Onondaga regarding
each individual treaty executed by the State of New York. Part II
compares the Western “labor” justification for settlement a
background principle of property law set forth by John Locke with
the Iroquois conception of sovereignty and land use, codified in
Gayanashogowa or the Great Law of Peace. Part III examines the
existing trust relationship between the federal government and
Native American tribes, developed through both statutes and
common law.
Part IV underscores the position the Onondaga
Nation must take to expose the injustice caused by the treaties, and
to enforce the federal government’s duty to act on the Nation’s
behalf.
I. THE ONONDAGA LAND CLAIM
A. The Parties
1. The Onondaga Nation
The Onondaga Nation is an officially recognized Indian tribe
residing within a 7,300-acre reservation south of Nedrow, New
York.18 The Nation brings its land claim under the authority of the
Onondaga Council of Chiefs, discussed below as the Nation’s
governing body.19
The Nation is a member of the Haudenosaunee (“People of the
Longhouse”) Confederacy, known in English as the “Six Nations
Iroquois Confederacy.”20 The Confederacy is an alliance of six
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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individual nations the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga,
Seneca, and Tuscarora who are unified under a common traditional
law called Gayanashogowa or the Great Law of Peace.21 Within
this indigenous system of government, the Onondaga have
maintained a status as the fire keeper, the spiritual center for the
Haudenosaunee, for several centuries.22 Therefore, the Onondaga
brings suit on its own behalf and on behalf of the Haudenosaunee
Confederacy.23
2. Corporate Defendants
a. Honeywell International, Inc.
Honeywell International, Inc. (“Honeywell”), a New Jersey
corporation, owned industrial property along the southwest shore of
Onondaga Lake from the 1880s until the 1980s.24 According to the
Onondaga complaint, Honeywell and its predecessor companies
contributed to the environmental degradation of the area by dumping
mercury and other chemical contaminants into the Lake.25 Sources
indicate that most of the lake’s pollution can be specifically attributed
to the actions of Allied Chemical Corporation, which closed in 1986
and merged with Honeywell in 1999.26 As such, Honeywell has
been held legally responsible for almost all cleanup costs in the area,
and is the main corporate defendant in this action.27
b. Clark Concrete Company, Inc. and Valley Realty Development
Company
Clark Concrete Company (“Clark”) and its affiliate, Valley Realty
Development Company (“Valley Realty”) are Syracuse based

21
Haudenosaunee
Confederacy,
Great
Law
of
Peace,
http://sixnations.buttnet.net/Great.Law.of.Peace/
22 Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
23 Id.
24 Complaint, supra note 1, at 5; William Kates, State Presents Final Lake Cleanup
Plan,
Tribe
Calls
it
Inadequate,
Associated
Press,
July
1,
2005,
http://www.onondaganation.org/news.july05.html.
25 Complaint, supra note 1, at 5; Kates, supra note 24
26 Kates, supra note 24.
27See id. Honeywell is legally responsible for the clean up of Onondaga Lake
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
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corporations occupying large portions of the land at issue.28 Clark
operates the Tully gravel mine, which the Onondaga allege has both
degraded the head waters of the Onondaga Creek and disrupted
“areas of extreme archeological and cultural sensitivity.”29 The area
where Clark began mining operations in 1997 is the site where
wampum, discussed below as part of the Iroquois method of
recording history, was first found.30
c. Trigen Syracuse Energy Corporation
Trigen Syracuse Energy Corporation (“Trigen”) operates an
energy “cogeneration” plant near Syracuse.31 The plant emits
significant amounts of hydrochloric acids and dioxins while burning
coal and plastic waste.32 The Onondaga include Trigen in its suit
because of its role in the degradation of air quality throughout the
region.33
3. Government Defendants
Although the Onondaga Nation names both Onondaga County
and the City of Syracuse as parties in their complaint, the principal
government defendant in this case is the State of New York (“the
State”).34 The State is the professed original “purchaser” of the
subject land, having conducted numerous treaties with the
Onondaga from the late eighteenth through early nineteenth
centuries.35 The State has since conveyed the land to private
parties, including the corporate defendants listed above.36
The State has the right to claim sovereign immunity against this
action under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution.37
Accordingly, the Onondaga request the State to waive its immunity
28 Complaint,supra note 1, at 5.
29 Id.
30 Mike McAndrew, Onondagas File Huge Land Claim, The Post-Standard, Mar. 11,
2005, available at www.syracuse.com.
31 Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.
32 Id.
33 Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.
34 See id. at 3-5.
35 See id. at 7-10.
36 Id. at 3-6.
37 See U.S. Const. amend. XI. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 US 286
(1942)
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“in the interest of fairness toward the other defendants and in the
interest of justice.”38 In the event that the State does not waive its
immunity, the Onondaga also brought suit against Governor George
Pataki, in his official capacity as the Governor of New York and in his
individual capacity, alleging that he is acting beyond the scope of his
authority by claiming an interest in the land.39 Most importantly, the
Onondaga request the United States government to file an identical
suit against the State as a trustee/fiduciary to the Nation.40 If the
United States acts on behalf of the Onondaga, its suit will bypass any
sovereign immunity asserted by the State.41
B. The Land and the Lake
Until 1788, the Onondaga held a forty-mile wide slice of New
York State.42 According to its claim, the Onondaga’s aboriginal land
extends south from Canada to the Pennsylvania border, and east
from the St. Lawrence River to Lake Ontario situated between the
native land of the Cayuga to the west and the Oneida to the east.43
This area includes most of present day Jefferson, Oswego,
Onondaga, and Cortland counties, encompassing approximately 3100 square miles.44 Today, the Nation resides on only eleven
square miles of land, with nearly 875,000 non-Indian residents
occupying former Onondaga territory.45
Though all of the land at issue is of vital importance to the
Onondaga, its claim focuses on the environmental degradation of
Onondaga Lake.46 Accordingly, this section focuses on the
Onondaga’s deep cultural connection to the Lake, and the Lake’s
current condition.
1. The History of Onondaga Lake

38 Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.
39 Id.
40 Indian Law Resource Center, supra note 1.
41 Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.
42 The Post Standard, How the Onondaga Territory Shrank Mar. 11, 2005, available
at http://www.syracuse.com/printer/printer.ssf?/news/indianlandclaims/story5.html.
43 Id.; Complaint, supra note 1, at 6-7.
44 Complaint, supra note 1, app. at 15; Semple, supra note 1.
45 McAndrew, supra note 30.
46 See Indian Law Resource Center, supra note 1.
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Historians trace human settlement of Onondaga Lake as far
back as 8000 BC, when the retreat of glaciers opened up large
areas of inhabitable land around present day Central New York.47
Until its acquisition by the State of New York in 1795, the Lake and
the hills surrounding it served as the cultural and economic center of
the Onondaga Nation.48 As an essential transportation and
communication route, the Lake and its tributaries connected the
Onondaga to other native communities.49 These interactions
compelled five separate nations from the area to unite on the Lake’s
shores several hundred years ago to form the Haudenosaunee
Confederacy.50 As Chief Sid Hill of the Onondaga Nation stated in
2004:
The Onondaga Nation. . . is connected to this body of water
by
ties that transcend time and space. Our ancestors walked the paths
around Onondaga Lake. They hunted, fished, and paddled across its
once-blue waters. Most certainly, they stopped on the shores
to
give thanks for all that the Creator had given them.51

In addition to its strong historical significance, the Lake is often
characterized as the lifeblood of Iroquois, particularly Onondaga,
civilization.52 Prior to European settlement, the Lake had an
unusually vast growth of algae and was thus capable of supporting
a cold water fishery habitat.53 An extensive supply of fresh fish
sustained the Onondaga for several centuries.54
2. The Settlement and Environmental Degradation of Onondaga
Lake

47 Onondaga Lake Partnership, Lake Area Settlement & Development,
http://www.onlakepartners.org/p1102.html.
48 See id.
49 Id.
50 See McAndrew, supra note 30. In an interview, Chief Sid Hill, referring to the
Lake, stated, “That’s our cathedral, right there.” Id.
51 Sid Hill, Letter to the Editor, Post Standard Dec. 4, 2004, available at
http://www.onondaganation.org/news.sid12405.html.
52 See id.
53 See id.
54
Upstate
Freshwater
Institute
(UFI),
Onondaga
Lake,
http://www.upstatefreshwater.org/html/onondaga_lake.hrml.
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In 1654, the Onondaga Nation revealed the existence of salt
springs within the Lake to French settlers.55 Settlement increased
in the eighteenth century, as Jesuit missionaries, trappers, and
traders began following French explorers into the area.56 The
completion of the Erie Canal in the early 1800s fully opened Central
New York State to new settlement, and a booming salt industry.57
The industrial revolution brought various chemical operations to
the Onondaga Lake area, including Allied Chemical, now known as
Allied Signal, Inc.58 The State first interfered with the Lake’s natural
ecosystem in 1822, when it dredged the outlet of the Lake to lower
the water level and drain wetlands.59 The dredged area has since
become lower downtown Syracuse.60
As a result of over 100 years of chemical dumping by industries
such as Allied, Onondaga Lake is now considered to be the most
polluted lake in the United States.61 With its ecosystem completely
disrupted, the Lake has an excessive growth of algae, making the
water unviable as an economic resource.62 Swimming in the Lake
was banned in 1940 and fishing in 1970.63 A combination of
industrial and municipal waste, mainly from sewage and mercury,
has caused a significant decrease to the Lake’s value as a
recreational area.64 Under state regulations, New York filed a
national resources damages claim in 1989 against Honeywell.65
Five years later, the Lake was listed as a Superfund site under the
federal Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).66
C. The Treaties
The Onondaga allege that five treaties conveying aboriginal land
to the State of New York were illegally executed and are therefore
void.67 Each treaty is briefly discussed below and identified by date.
55 Onondaga Lake Partnership, supra note 47.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60OnondagaLake, supra note 47.
61 UFI, supra note 54.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Onondaga Lake, supra note 47.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 The Post-Standard, supra note 42.
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1. 1788
In 1788 the Onondaga Nation conveyed two million acres of
aboriginal territory to the State of New York.68 In addition, the treaty
established that Onondaga Lake and its surrounding areas would be
held for the shared benefit of the State and the Onondaga for the
exclusive purpose of making salt.69 The State, in return for the
agreement, paid the Nation $1000 French crowns and 200 pounds of
clothing, with an additional promise to make payments of $500 per
year.70
Through this treaty, the Onondaga lost all but 108 square miles
of its aboriginal land.71 The treaty came about when New York’s
then governor, George Clinton, told the Onondaga that white settlers
would steal its land without granting compensation.72 In response to
the apparent threat, two members of the Nation, Kahikton and
Tehonwaghsloweaghte, negotiated with the State.73 The Onondaga
claim that these two individuals were not chiefs, and therefore did
not have the authority to settle treaties on behalf of the Nation. 74
Following protests made by the Onondaga Council of Chiefs, the
State met with the Onondaga in the Spring of 1790 to ratify and
confirm the 1788 treaty. 75 The treaty was ratified on June 16, 1790,
only one month prior to the passing of the federal Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act discussed below as the legislation which prohibited
states from conducting land dealings with Native American tribes
without congressional approval.76
Though the treaty was signed prior to the passing of the Trade
and Intercourse Act, the Onondaga argue that under a New York
State real property law the treaty was legally ineffective until its date
of recording November 25, 1791.77 Therefore, the Onondaga’s

68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 The Post Standard, supra note 43.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Complaint, supra note 1, at 8-9.
76 Id. 25 U.S.C.. § 177 was passed on July 22, 1790. Id. at 8.
77 See id. at 9.
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claim to over half of the disputed land rests on a contingency that the
court will apply the New York State recording statute.78
2. 1793
In a 1793 treaty the State purchased about seventy-nine square
miles of territory which is now comprised of Syracuse and its
surrounding suburbs for a total payment of $410.79 In order to
circumvent the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, the State
Surveyor General Simeon DeWitt and Senator John Cantine assured
the Onondaga that the State intended to lease, rather than buy, its
land.80 The treaty itself states that New York is the new owner of
the land, though Congress never approved of the sale as required by
the Act.81 Accordingly, the court will determine the legitimacy of
this treaty under the factors used to determine a Trade and
Intercourse Act violation.82
3. 1795
The Onondaga lost all rights to Onondaga Lake in a 1795 treaty
with the State.83 In direct violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act,
the State purportedly bought the rights to Onondaga Lake and the
mile around it for $500 and 100 bushels of salt per year.84 Although
U.S. Attorney General William Bradford notified Governor Clinton
that the State could not buy land unless the treaty was approved by
Congress, Clinton followed through with the sale.85 He later gifted
the three Onondagas who signed the treaty one square mile each.86
d. 1817 and 1822
The formation of these two treaties involved the participation of
Ephraim Webster, an interpreter secured by the State and the first
78 See id. The elements needed for establishing a Trade and Intercourse Act
violation are listed in Part III below.
79 The Post Standard, supra note 43.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See id.
83 Id.
84 The Post Standard, supra note 43.
85 Id.
86 Id.
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white settler of Syracuse.87 Although the Onondaga accused
Webster of betraying their trust through intentional misinterpretation,
they nonetheless lost a total of 4,893 acres of reservation territory
through these two treaties.88 Both treaties were never approved by
Congress, and will therefore be scrutinized by the court as potential
violations of the Trade and Intercourse Act.89
D. The Remedy
If this suit prevails, the Onondaga Nation does not intend to
evict business and homeowners from the land.90 Nor do they plan
to collect rents or operate gaming facilities.91 Rather, the Nation’s
members hope to use a declaratory judgment in their favor to force
the State to restore their indigenous territory to its original
condition.92
In recent years, the Onondaga has shown its
sensitivity towards non-Indian neighbors residing in its aboriginal
territory by collaborating with both rural and urban community
organizations engaged in environmental cleanup.93 As Sid Hill
stated in a 2005 interview, “We’re trying to do a different land-rights
action here¼.Our concern is the environment and how we as two
peoples can live in the area that was our ancestors.”94 As such, this
claim arises solely out of the Onondaga’s desire to have some
control over the well-being of its aboriginal land.95
The restoration of Onondaga Lake is the central focus of this
law suit.96 Under New York State’s current cleanup plan, Honeywell
will spend $451 million over the course of seven years to dredge
2.65 million yards of contaminated sediment from the bottom of the
Lake.97 In addition, the plan calls for a cap made of sand, gravel,
and other material to be placed over the remaining 579 acres.98
Honeywell has proposed a less expensive and extensive cleanup
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See id.
90 McAndrew, supra note 30, at 1-2.
91 Id.
92 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2; id.
93 Onondaga Nation, The Onondaga Nation and Environmental Stewardship,
http://www.onondaganation.org/media.environment.html.
94 McAndrew, supra note 30.
95 See id.
96 See Kates, supra note 24.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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plan: a $237 million dollar, three year plan to dredge 508, 000 cubic
yards and cap the remaining 350 acres.99 The Onondaga, on the
other hand, call for an extremely thorough cleanup.100 For their
plan, they demand nearly 22 million cubic yards of sediment
dredged with a cap over the entire lake bottom of 2329 acres.101
The Onondaga plan will cost $2.3 billion and will take seventeen
years to complete.102
By making environmental cleanup the cornerstone of this
lawsuit, the Onondaga emphasizes its strong historic connection to
the land at issue a relationship which, it believes, trumps any
concern over money.103 Therefore, this suit is, above all, an effort
to hold the State of the New York and private corporations fully
accountable for disrupting and disrespecting the Onondaga’s
centuries old existence. 104 The theory used to justify this
(mis)treatment is discussed in the following section.
II. CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY
In the Two Treatises of Government, John Locke constructed
the formative assumptions used by European settlers to justify the
acquisition of property rights over Native American land.105
As
James Tully, the author of “Aboriginal Property and Western Theory,”
states, it is Locke’s principle assumptions which “conjoin to
misrecognize two conditions of [Native American] peoples at the time
of European arrival and settlement: their systems of property and
their political organizations.”106 Despite Locke’s fundamental
misrecognition, his assumptions regarding Native American political
and economic “underdevelopment” formed the basis for Western
constructions of control and ownership.107
This section first
examines Locke’s prevailing theory of private property rights and
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Kates, supra note 24.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 James Tully, Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle
Ground, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY, 158-59 (1994) (discussing JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 14, 30, 49, 108, 109 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
University Press, 1970).
106 Tully, supra note105 , at 158.
107 See id. at 164-67.
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Western attitudes towards Native American societies, and then
distinguishes key European assumptions from existing Native
American conceptions of property.
A. The Western Notion of Property: Locke’s Labor Justification
Locke’s theory, as articulated in the Second Treatise, rests on
the belief that Native Americans were in a pre-political “state of
nature” phase of historical and political development, a phase which
European societies had long surpassed.108 As Locke stated, “[I]n
the beginning, all the World was America”109 with no system of
government nor property and, since then, Europeans developed
complex legal systems governing land ownership and commercial
agriculture.110
From this belief, Locke came to the widely accepted conclusion
that Europeans could settle and acquire private property rights to
“vacant” land through means of labor as defined by European
norms of agriculture and mercantilism.111 Under Locke’s view, the
primary reason for the so-called underdevelopment of Native
American peoples was their limited use for property, demonstrated
by their inclination towards hunting and gathering rather than
cultivation and commercial sale.112
Since Native American
communities did not use land to produce surplus, Locke conceived
that their property rights rest in the products of their labor the fish
that they catch, the deer that they hunt, the food that they
gather rather than in the land itself.113
With an understanding that the European system of surplus was
far superior to the Native American system of subsistence hunting
and gathering, Locke claimed that settlement and exercise of
dominion over Native American lands served both societies by: (1)
using the land more efficiently, (2) producing a greater number of
amenities, and (3) creating more work through a division of labor.114
Accordingly, Locke’s arguments were used by theorists throughout
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to defend European

108Id. at 159.
109 Tully, supra note 105, at 159 (quoting Locke, supra note 105, § 49).
110 Tully, supra note 105, at 159.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 160 (citing Locke, supra note 105, at §§ 37, 40-43, 48-49).
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settlement and the dispossession of Native American lands.115 For
example, Emeric de Vattel, in The Law of Nations or Principles of
Natural Law, wrote:
Every Nation is therefore bound by the law of nature to cultivate
that land which has fallen to its share. There are others who, in
order to avoid labour, seek to live upon their flocks and the fruits of
the chase. Now that the human race has multiplied so greatly, it
could not subsist if every people wished to live after that fashion.
Those who still pursue this idle mode of life occupy more land than
they would have need of under a system of honest labour, and they
may not complain if other more industrious nations, too confined at
home, should come and occupy part of their lands.116

de Vattel, like other theorists following Locke’s arguments,
perpetuated a misunderstanding that settlers were entitled to Native
American lands.117
Locke’s foundational assumptions regarding European rights
over Native American lands bypasses a basic principle of Western
law: the requirement of consent in the formation of contracts.118
The labor justification may have played a part in the Onondaga case
because, as discussed below, the tribe was dispossessed of its land
without any clear indication of mutual assent or even knowledge.119
Since the federal government’s fiduciary duty, discussed in Part II,
ensures that Native American tribes are contracted with equitably,
the State’s disregard for mutual assent therefore imposes a strong
obligation upon the federal government to intervene on the
Onondaga’s behalf.120
B. Gayanashogowa: The Great Law of Peace and Native American
Conceptions of Property

115 See id.
116 Tully, supra note 105, at 165 (discussing Emeric de Vattel, Le droit des gens, ou
principle de la loi naturelle (1758) reprinted The Law of Nations or the Principles of
Natural Law 207-10, (Charles G. Fenwick trans. Carnegie Institute, 1902). Ironically, the
Onondaga refers to their own system of property ownership and use as “Natural Law.”
The Honorable Oren Lyons, Chief, Onondaga Nation, Sovereignty and Sacred Land in 13
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 19, 20 (Fall 2000).
117 Tully, supra note 105 , at 159.
118 Id. at 160 (discussing quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet
(“what touches all must be agreed upon by all.”).
119 See id.
120 See infra text accompanying notes 213-16.
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Despite Locke’s contention that Native American societies were
in a pre-political, “underdeveloped” state, historical evidence
indicates that a highly developed, complex, and vibrant system of
governance and property ownership existed among Iroquois tribes
prior to European arrival.121 A typical form of Iroquois government
was a nation led by a longhouse, or council, of chiefs taken from
familial clans.122 Each nation was comprised of several governing
elements: “clearly demarcated and defended territory, a decisionmaking body, a consensus-based decision-making procedure, and a
system of customary laws and kinship relations.”123 Though nations
did not have standing armies, bureaucracy, or police, individual
nations engaged in trade, diplomacy, and war as distinct, selfgoverning entities.124 When the Haudenosaunee confederacy was
formed, five individual Iroquois nations joined to form one union,
governed by the Grand Council of Chiefs.125
The central feature of Iroquois governance among nations was
Gayanashogowa, or the Great Law of Peace, the oldest living
constitution in North America and the founding constitution of the
Haudenosaunee confederacy.126
At its core, Gayanashogowa
defines the functions of the Grand Council of Chiefs and dictates
how the six nations resolve conflicts among one another.127
Though Gayanashogowa is an oral tradition, it has been recorded
and translated several times.128 These written accounts describe
strong cultural metaphors associated with the land:
The Peacemaker established the symbols of the Great Law.
The Longhouse has five fireplaces but one family . . . .The Tree
of
121 See id. at 177.
122 Tully, supra note 105, at 163; W ILLIAM N. FENTON, THE GREAT LAW AND THE
LONGHOUSE: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY 7 (University of
Oklahoma Press 1998); See also Arthur C. Parker, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIVE
NATIONS, OR THE IROQUOIS BOOK OF THE GREAT LAW, in PARKER ON THE IROQUOIS 41
(William N. Fenton ed., Syracuse University Press, 1968) (Parker published a written
account of Gayanashogowa, stating that “The War Chiefs shall be selected from the
eligible sons of the female families holding the head Lordship titles.”
123 See id.
124 Tully, supra note 105, at 163.
125 The Haudenosaunee Confederacy, The Great Law of Peace: What are the
values and traditions of the Founding Constitution of the Iroquois Confederacy? 1,
http://sixnations.buttnet.net/Great_Law_of_Peace.
The Tuscarora Nation joined the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy from the South in 1712. Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
126 Haudenosaunee, supra note 125, at 1. See The Constitution of the Five
Nations, supra note 122, at 7-13.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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Peace was
planted in the center of the circle of
eagle was placed on top to watch out for enemies. The White
Peace stretched out across the
land . . . . The meal of
was shared . . . . These are all symbols of power that
from the unity of
peace.129

chiefs. An
Roots of
beaver tail
comes

The Peacemaker, who constructed Gayanashogowa, instructed each
individual and nation to make decisions on behalf of the seventh
generation to come a notion embedded in the Haudenosaunee and
Onondaga worldview.130 Thus, under the principles of “good word,
peace, and power” the Onondaga maintained sovereignty over their
lands throughout several centuries.131
1. Native American Traditions of Land Ownership
Unlike Western societies, the Haudenosaunee believed in
collective, common ownership of real property among members of
the Confederacy.132 Though the territory of each nation became
Haudenosaunee land, individual nations maintained a special
interest in their historic territory and ultimate title rested in female
members of each nation.133 Jurisdiction over the land was held in
trust by a Council, comprised of two types of chiefs: (1) war chiefs,
who dealt with the other nations under Gayanashogowa, and (2)
peace chiefs, who dealt mainly with civil affairs.134 The primary
responsibility of the Council of Chiefs, as protectors of the land,
rested in maintaining the nation’s territorial sovereignty.135
In most respects, the identity of a nation as a distinct people was
indivisible from its historical relationship to the land in all of its uses,
129 Id.
130 Oren Lyons, Council of Chiefs Onondaga Nation,Letter to Editor, Post-Standard,
http://www.onondaganation.org/news.oct1705.html.
131 See id. As Syracuse religion professor Phil Arnold recently stated, "Only three
Indian nations [in the US] are still governed by sacred means. Onondaga is one of them.”
Charles J. Reith, First Onondaga Land Rights Action Talk Gathers a Crowd,
http://www.peacecouncil.net/NOON/commonfuture/media/NationMidstRept.html.
Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2 (stating “[T]he Nation and its people have a unique
spiritual, cultural, and historic relationship with the land, which is embodied in
Gayanashogowa, the Great Law of Peace.”).
132 Fenton, supra note 122, at 7.
133 Haudenosaunee Confederacy, Grand Council: What are the Land Rights of the
Haudenosaunee?
(Aug.
1981),
http://sixnations.buttnet.net/Grand_Council/?article=land_rights; Fenton, supra note 122,
at 7.
134 Fenton, supra note 122, at 7.
135 See id.
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its domestic animals, its ecology, and the spirits that share the land
with living beings.136 A common spiritual conception was that the
earth, particularly the North American continent, is a great turtle, with
all of life’s necessities on its back.137 With this strong identification
with the land came rights and responsibilities, which were conveyed
through matrilineal ties and oral traditions.138 Though this “bundle
of rights” scheme initially appears similar to Western conceptions of
property ownership, its distinctive feature was an understanding that
property rights relate to forms of activity on the land, rather than the
material products of such activities or the monetary value of the land
itself.139
As such, there was no right of sale within the Haudenosaunee
conception of property.140 The confederacy may convey a right of
co-use to temporarily join in its existence and relationship to the
land.141 However, as the Haudenosaunee Grand Council states,
“This land, the Turtle Island, was created for all to use forever - not to
be merely exploited for this present generation. In no event is land
for sale.”142
2. Kahswentha, The Two Row Wampum
From 1645 to 1815, the Haudenosaunee conducted internationalstyle dealings called Kahswentha, or Two Row Wampum
Treaties.143
The treaties involved the gifting of wampum
belts used to visually represent relations among Native American
nations and outside parties to Europeans.144 The wampum belt
now serves as an historical artifact, signifying the true understanding

136 Tully, supra note 105, at 164.
As discussed above, every aspect of the
indigenous land held a distinct place within the Iroquois constitution. Therefore, each
nation’s identity was linked to its existence with nature. This principal, embodied in
Gayanashogowa, indicates that the balance between mankind and nature is crucial to
Iroquois self-governance.
137 Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 133.
138 See Fenton, supra note 122, at 27, 129; Tully, supra note 105, at 164.
139 Fenton, supra note 122, at 113-14; Tully, supra note 105, at 164. .
140 Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 133.
141 The text of Gayanashogowa provides for the temporary sharing of lands. The
Constitution of the Five Nations,supra note 122, at 51.
142 Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 133.
143 See generally RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND
REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650-1815, 305-17 (Cambridge University Press
1991)(discussing early treaty relations).
144 Tully, supra note 105, at 177.

2006] Gayanashogowa and Guardianship: Expanding and Clarifying the FederalTribal Trust Relationship
19

of Native American, particularly Iroquois, nations concerning
negotiations and transactions.145
The three visual components of a wampum belt represent an
approach which differs greatly from those set forth by Locke and
other European theorists. A white background symbolizes the purity
of an agreement,146 two parallel rows of purple beads symbolize the
autonomy of native and non-native parties taking part in the
negotiation, and three individual beads set between the two rows
symbolize peace, friendship, and respect.147
In a presentation
made to the Canadian House of Commons Committee on Indian
Self-Government in 1983, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy clarified
the meaning of the two parallel rows:
[The beads] symbolize two paths or two vessels, traveling down the
same rivers together. One, a birch bark canoe, will be for the Indian
people, their laws, their customs, and their ways. The other, a ship,
will be for the white people and their laws, their customs, and their
ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in
our own boat. Neither of use will try to steer the other’s vessel.148

This view is consistent with the text of Gayanashogowa, which states
that “[a foreign nation] must never try to control, to interfere with or to
injure the Five Nations nor disregard the Great Peace or any of its
rules or customs . . . Then should the adopted nation disregard these
injunctions, their adoption shall be annulled and they shall be
expelled.”149 As demonstrated by these historical records, the
Haudenosaunee viewed its political system based on spiritual and

145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See id.; Parker, supra note 122, at 51.
148 Tully, supra note 105, at 177 (quoting Haudenosaunee Confederacy,
Presentation to the House of Commons Committee on Indian Self-Government (1983),
reprinted by Michael Mitchell, An Unbroken Assertion of Sovereignty, in DRUMBEAT:
ANGER AND RENEWAL IN INDIAN COUNTRY 109-10, Boyce Richardson, ed., (Summerhill
Press-The Assembly of First Nations 1989)).
149 This portion of the text refers to the Haudenosaunee’s temporary adoption of
foreign nations. Gayanashogowa commands the War Chiefs to carry out an expulsion by
stating:
Now the Lords of the Five Nations have decided to expel you and cast you out.
We disown you now and annul your adoption. Therefore you must look
for a path in caused this sentence of annulment. So then go your way and
depart from the territory of the Five Nations and from the Confederacy.”
Parker, supra note 122, at 51.
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ancestral rather than commercial ties to land as everlasting and
dominant.150
III. The Trust Relationship
The relationship between Native American tribes and the
federal government is predicated upon a principle that “powers which
are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are . . . inherent [residual]
powers of limited sovereignty which [have] never been
extinguished.”151 Within the realm of “limited sovereignty” retained
by tribes exists the right of self-government, defined by Felix Cohen
as “the power of an Indian tribe to adopt and operate under a form of
government of the Indians’ choosing.”152 The trust relationship
therefore adheres to a basic tenet of the theory of conquest: “[i]t is
only by positive enactments, even in the case of conquered and
subdued nations, that their laws [are] changed by the conqueror.”153
Though tribes hold the power of self-government, their status as
“conquered,” dependant entities places them under the protection of
the United States government.154 Accordingly, the trust relationship
includes a series of moral and legal obligations and expectancies,
the most important being a legal fiduciary duty on the part of the
Executive Branch.155
The fiduciary duty obligates the federal
150 See id.
151 Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 122 (1988).
152 Cohen explains that within the complex and largely undefined relationship
between tribes and the federal government, self-government is the most significant
remnant of Native American sovereignty
“the Indian’s last defense against
administrative oppression.” Other elements of tribal self-government include “the power
to define conditions of tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations of members, to
prescribe rules of inheritance, to levy taxes, to regulate property within the jurisdiction of
the tribe, to control the conduct of members by municipal legislation, and to administer
justice.”Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 116; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1886) (stating
“They [Indian tribes] are dependant on the United States. . . Dependent for their
political rights. . . From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them, and the treaties in which it has
been
promised, there arises the duty of protection. . . . ”).
155 See id. at 123. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), located within the Department
of Interior, is the administrative agency responsible for the fulfillment of the federal trust
relationship. Unfortunately, threats against Indians often come from other agencies
within the Department of Interior and their constituents. As such, the Bureau has been
criticized on various counts by tribes who believe the Bureau favors non-Indian over
Indian interests. The Supreme Court has ruled that the interests of federal agencies
must supersede those of Indian tribes. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 127
(1983) (stating that the Bureau’s obligation to its other beneficiaries excuses the
government from following “the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary.”); Scholder v.
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government to act on behalf of Indian tribes to protect the tribes’
inherent, residual sovereignty against intrusions by states and
private parties.156
As a necessary element of the fiduciary duty,
the federal government must act as an intermediary between states
and Native American tribes, ensuring the best interests of the Indian
in all circumstances.157 The trust relationship therefore serves as a
shield “to protect tribes from the ever-encroaching fangs of the
states”158 a protection which Congress alone has the authority to
sever.159
The nature of the federal-tribal relationship raises a key issue in
the case of the Onondaga because the Nation’s right to be governed
under Gayanashogowa comports with its right to selfgovernment.160
Any infringement upon the Onondaga’s form of
governance by the State triggers a duty on the part of federal
government to intervene.161 As such, the Onondaga must establish
that unlawful dealings by the State of New York directly imposed
upon the tribe’s ability to follow Gayanashogowa.162
This section explores the statutory and common law
constructions of the trust relationship, underscoring the fiduciary
responsibilities of the federal government with regards to tribal/state
relations.163 Because the scope and reach of the trust relationship
is largely undefined, the information presented below signals an

United States, 428 F.2d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970)(involving
the Bureau’s failure to provide irrigation for Indian residents, despite providing for nonIndians.).
156 Cohen, supra note 151, at 123.
157 See id.
158 Peter D. Lepsch, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Is New York State’s Move to
Cleanup the Akwesasne Reservation an Endeavor to Assert Authority Over Indian
Tribes?, 8 ALB.L.ENVTL.OUT.J 65, 85(2002). Kagama, 118 U.S. 383 (“[b]ecause of the
local ill feeling, the people of the States where they [Native tribes] are found are often
their deadliest enemies.”).
159 Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d at 380 (denying
state’s claim that the tribe is precluded by acquiescence from asserting a trust
relationship and stating that “once Congress has established a trust relationship with an
Indian tribe, Congress alone has the right to determine when its guardianship shall
cease”).
160 Cohen, supra note 151, at 122-23.
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,16 (1831); Passamaquoddy, 528 F.2d 370(1975).
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opportunity for litigants like the Onondaga to craft boundaries which
protect a broader range of native interests.164
A. Constitutional Origins of the Trust Relationship
The textual origins of the federal-tribal relationship derive from
the United States Constitution.165 Immediately after the American
Revolution, the Articles of Confederation, quite vaguely, declared
that:
The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the
sole and exclusive right and power of. . . regulating the
trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members
of the any of the States within its own limits be not in
fringed or violated. 166

With the adoption of the new Constitution, the general trend
towards increasing federal authority extended to Indian affairs.167
Therefore Article I, section 8, clause 3 (the Indian Commerce
Clause) granted Congress the broad authority “[t]o regulate
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”168 This clause, in conjunction with the
Supremacy Clause, creates a grant of power to Congress for
legislation dealing with Native American tribes.169 The authority
bestowed upon the federal government by the Constitution
established a federal-tribal relationship, which would evolve into a
trust relationship under the Marshall decisions discussed below .170
B. The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act

164 See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A
New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995
UTAH L. REV. 109, 122-23.
165 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (excluding the state
from conducting trade and limiting the right to tax on Native Americans to the federal
government); 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1790).
166 DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW : CASES AND MATERIALS 33 (West
Publishing, 1979) (citing ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX)(alteration in original).
167 Id.
168 U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 3. (emphasis added).
169 Getches, supra note 166, at 33; Wood, supra note 164, at 122-23.
170 See id. Though the trust relationship is a function of judicial decree, the
exclusion of states from tribal relations provides a textual basis for the Marshall decisions
(discussed below).
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In the early federal period, Congress constructed the basis for
federal Indian relations through laws designed “to regulate trade and
intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace on the
frontier.”171 These laws, commonly known as the Non Intercourse
Acts, were formulated to realize a number of goals, articulated by
Francis Paul Prucha as: (1) allocating the power to manage Indian
affairs between states and the federal government, (2) extinguishing,
in an organized manner, Native American title in order to expand
white settlements, (3) restraining non-government entities and
“frontiersman” from invading territory still claimed by Indians, and (4)
“fulfilling the responsibility that the Christian whites had to aid the
savage pagans along the path toward civilization.”172 In sum, the
laws were designed to eradicate Indian ownership of land without
igniting a violent backlash. 173
1. The Origins of the Trade and Intercourse Act
The first Native American Trade and Intercourse Act was
passed in 1790 two years after the State of New York negotiated its
first treaty with the Onondaga.174 The Act was a necessary means
to suppress foreseeable conflict between white settlers and Native
American tribes.175 Even before 1790, the federal government had
set explicit boundaries for Indian Country by excluding white settlers
from entering the area, and denying the right of private individuals or
local governments to acquire land from the Indians.176
The architect of this policy, then president George Washington,
envisioned peace with native tribes through organized, steady
occupation rather than exercises of conquest.177 As such, upon
hearing disturbing accounts of violence on the American frontier,
Washington urged Congress to pass legislation placing a sharp
boundary between white settlers and Native American tribes.178
After six enactments, the Trade and Intercourse Act reads, in
pertinent part:
171 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS:
INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834 2 (Harvard University Press 1962).
172 Id. at 1-2.
173 Id. at 3.
174 Id. (The final, most lasting Act was passed in 1834).
175 Id.
176 See id. at 45-49.
177 Prucha, supra note 171, 45.
178 See id. at 45-49.
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No purchase, grant, lease or other conveyance of land, or of
any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians,
shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty
or conveyance entered into pursuant to the Constitution.179

As Prucha points out, the Act only indirectly affects Native American
tribes by limiting them in their ability to trade and sell land.180 It
does not, in and of itself, provide any sort of protection by the federal
government.181 Rather, the Act merely conforms to the political
agenda of the early federal period: defining the relationship between
the federal government and the states.182 By granting the federal
government the sole right to purchase and acquire Native American
lands, the Act forecloses states from dealing directly with Indian
tribes. 183
2. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida
In County of Oneida v. Oneida Nation of New York, the Oneida
Naton, also a member of the Haudenosaunee confederacy, sought
monetary damages for the use and occupancy of lands acquired by
the State of New York in 1795.184 The case is remarkably similar to
the Onondaga case:
the complaint alleged that “from time
immemorial to shortly after the Revolution, the Oneidas inhabited
what is now central New York State.”185
From 1795 to 1846,
twenty-five treaties were executed between the State and the Oneida
Nation.186 Of these, “[o]nly two . . . were conducted under federal
supervision, as required by the Non Intercourse Act.”187 By 1846,
the Oneida’s land had diminished from nearly six million acres to
only a few hundred acres.188

179 25 U.S.C. §177.
180 Prucha, supra note 171, at 48.
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See id.
184 470 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1985).
185 Id. at 230.
186 Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 434 F..Supp. 517, 535(1977), aff’d
County of Oneida v. Oneida Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
187 Id.
188 Id.
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In assessing whether the conveyance comported with the
requirements of the Non Intercourse Act, the district court listed four
elements needed by Native American plaintiffs to establish a prima
facie case. 189 The plaintiff(s) must show that:
(1) it is or represents an Indian “tribe” within the meaning of the Act;
(2) the parcels of land at issue herein are covered by the Act as
tribal land;
(3) the United States has never consented to the alienation of
the tribal land;
(4) the trust relationship between the United States and the tribe,
which is established by coverage of the Act, has never been ter
minated or abandoned.190

The first element was easily met because the Oneida, like the
Onondaga, is a tribe recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.191
Since the six-million-acre territory within the boundaries of New York
State was part of the Oneida’s original land, the court confirmed that
the second element was also fulfilled.192 The State failed to
produce any evidence of a subsequent treaty by Congress ratifying
or consenting to the transaction, so the court established that the
third element was met.193 Finally, the court found no explicit
congressional termination of the trust relationship between the
Oneida Nation and the United States government.194
C. The Evolution of the Trust Relationship at Common
Law

189 Id.. at 537.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 538; Complaint, supra note 1, at 2-3 (“[The Onondaga] has been at all
relevant times, an “Indian nation” within the meaning of the federal Indian Trade and
Intercourse Acts of 1790 and later, now 25 U.S.C. § 177.) The responsibilities of the BIA
are discussed in note 155 above.
192 Oneida Nation, 434 F.Supp. at 538. The court cites an earlier Oneida case,
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-69 (1974), in which the
Supreme Court held that Indian title in their aboriginal land is entitled to federal
protection.
193 Id. at 538. Under the Trade and Intercourse Act, any treaty conveying land to
from a tribe to a state must be ratified by Congress. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1790).
194 Id. at 538. In Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d.
370 (1975), the First Circuit ruled that “any withdrawal of trust obligations by Congress
would have to have been ‘plain and unambiguous’ to be effective.” Id. at 380.
Accordingly, the Onondaga complaint asserts that “[t]he relationship of the Onondaga
Nation to the United States has never been terminated.” Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
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Though some form of a fiduciary duty may have been implicit in
the Constitution and the Trade and Intercourse Acts, the trust
relationship primarily grew out of common law decision-making.195
An expansive body of case law has defined the modern trust
relationship, as federal courts play a key role in demarcating
relationships among the federal government, state governments,
tribes, and individuals. 196
1. The Marshall Trilogy
The Marshall Trilogy consisting of Johnson v. M’Intosh,
Cherokee v. State of Georgia, and Worchester v. State of
Georgia marks the early development of the trust relationship.197
There, Marshall set forth a direct conceptual approach the legal
status Native American tribes.198 The three decisions collectively
establish the core principles of inherent, residual sovereignty and the
fiduciary duty:
(1)[B]y virtue of aboriginal, political, and territorial status,
Indian
tribes possessed certain incidents of preexisting sovereignty;
(2) this sovereignty was subject to diminution or elimination by the
United States, but not by the individual states;
(3) the tribes’ limited inherent sovereignty and their corresponding
dependency upon the United States for protection imposed on
the latter a trust responsibility.199

As such, the common-law fiduciary duty derives from a tension
inherent in all aspects of Native American law “between the
sovereign status of tribes existing as of the time of Euro-American
settlement and the. . . imposition of a new and ultimately dominant
government resulting from that settlement . . . .”200
195 See id.
196 See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Seminole
Nation v. U.S., 316 U.S. 286 (1942); Worchester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832);
Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Joint Tribal Council of
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1975).
197 See Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 518; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1;
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). This section will refer to the
relationship envisioned by Marshall as a “trust,” though, as discussed later on, the
Marshall Trilogy construed a ward/guardian, rather than trust, relationship.
198 Conference of Western Attorneys General (CWAG), American Indian Law
Deskbook 5 (Clay Smith ed. University Press of Colorado 2004).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 6.
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In Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice John Marshall held that a
conveyance of native land to a private individual by tribal chiefs was
invalid.201 In referring to the doctrine of discovery,202 Marshall
stated that, although Native American tribes held a right to occupy
the land, alienable or legal title ultimately rested in the hands of the
federal government.203 The federal government gained this right
through the conquest of inhabited country and the subsequent
formation of Euro-American societies upon Native American soil204
Therefore, only the United States could extinguish aboriginal title
through continued conquest or purchase.205
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia206 and Worchester v. State
of Georgia207 serve to clarify the holding in Johnson by affirming the
distinct, yet subjugated, status of Native American tribes.208
In
Cherokee, Marshall first defined the legal status of Native Americans
as “domestic dependant nations” whose “relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”209 Marshall expanded
upon this guardianship principle in Worchester, where he
characterized the Cherokee Nation as “a distinct community” in
which Georgia laws are inapplicable.210 In both decisions Marshall
set forth our understanding of Native American sovereignty: Native
American tribes are sovereign entities vis a vis the states, but
conquered and dependent entities in relation to the federal
government.211 In doing so, Marshall envisioned a ward/guardian
201 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 602.
202 Id. at 573. As Marshall states, “The exclusion of all other Europeans,
necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil
from the natives, and establishing settlements on it.” Id.
203 Id. at 591.
204 Id.
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of inhabited
country into conquest may appear, if the principle has been asserted
in the first
instance, and afterwards sustained, if a country has been
acquired and held un
der it; if the property of the great mass of the
community originates in it, it
becomes the law of the land, and cannot
be questioned. Id.
The “principle” which Marshall referred to appears to be Locke’s labor justification.
See supra text accompanying notes 111 -117.
205 Id. at 587.
206 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
207 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
208 Tully, supra note 105, at 175.
209 Cherokee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
210 Id. at 560.
211 See id. at 560-61. The Native American right to self-government is subject to
diminution by positive enactments by the federal government, not the states.
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relationship
between
the
federal
government
and
tribes propounding a view that the federal government must protect
uncivilized and vulnerable Native American tribes from the states.212
2. The Canons of Construction
In light of the guardianship imposed between the federal
government and Indian tribes under the Marshall Trilogy, courts have
developed specific canons of construction used to interpret treaties
negotiated between tribes and the federal government.213 Three
interpretive principles, designed to rectify bargaining inequality
between the government and Indian tribes, are: “[1] ambiguous
expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties
concerned; [2] Indian treaties must be interpreted as the Indians
themselves would have understood them; and [3] Indian treaties
must be liberally construed in favor of the Indians.”214 In most
instances, testimony is taken from tribal members, historians, and
anthropologists familiar with circumstances which may have existed
during the time the treaties were negotiated.215
Though the canons afford some protection to Native American
interests, their scope is limited to tribal dealings with the federal
government.216 Therefore, in the case of the Onondaga, the issue
remains whether the canons of construction can be extended to
apply to, and thereby nullify, treaties made between states and
Native American tribes.217 This determination turns on the extent of
the federal government’s fiduciary duty to protect tribes against
illegal and intrusive treaty-making by the states.218
3. Montana v. United States
Since the Marshall Trilogy, the trust relationship has experienced
little expansion beyond the protection of commercial interests, such
212 See id. at 560.
The ward-guardian advanced by Marshall should be
distinguished from the trustee-beneficiary relationship, which is far less paternalistic.
Courts in recent years have advanced the latter view with respect to the relationship
between the federal government and Tribes. This issue will discussed at greater length
in Part IV.
213 Getches, supra note 166, at 200.
214 Id. at 35.
215 Id. at 36.
216 See CWAG, supra note 198, at 17.
217 See id.
218 See id.
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as gaming, and an extraconstitutional status to maintain control over
internal affairs.219 The narrow construction of the trust relationship
was exemplified in Montana v. United States, a 1981 case where the
Crow Tribe attempted to prohibit non-members from hunting and
fishing on fee lands.220
In Montana, the Supreme Court introduced the general principle
that the “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent
with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive
without express congressional delegation.”221
The Court once
again affirmed that, through conquest, Native Americans had
divested control over their “external” relations with non-Indians.222
In doing so, the Court rejected the Crow’s sovereignty to proscribe
hunting and fishing on fee land held by non-Indians.223
Montana does, however, provide some benefit to the
Onondaga’s claim for declaratory judgment.224
The second
exception to the Montana rule states that a tribe may “retain inherent
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on
fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health and welfare of the tribe.”225 After asserting its claim to
fee title through a declaratory judgment, the Onondaga may
establish that hazardous environmental conditions caused by private
property owners threatens its political existence.226 If successfully
argued, the Montana exception would allow the Onondaga to
exercise civil regulatory authority over its land.227
219 See id. at 6.
220 450 U.S. at 544, 566 (1981). Following a late-nineteenth century congressional
policy of allotting reservation lands to individual tribal members, Indian allottees received
fee patents and subsequently transferred property to non-members of the tribe.
Because there was no actual “diminishment” of Indian lands, these allotments remained
part of the reservation. They are subject to federal rather than state control under 18
U.S.C. § 1151. CWAG, supra note 198, at 71-2.
221 Id. at 564 (referring to the residual, limited sovereignty discussed throughout this
section)(emphasis added).
222 See id.
223 Id. at 566.
224 See id.
225 Id. (emphasis added) The first exception, inapplicable in the Onondaga case,
allows tribes to exercise civil authority over nonmembers “who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, though commercial dealing, contracts, leases,
or other arrangements. Id. at 565.
226 See id.
227 See id.
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IV. Establishing Title Using the Trust Relationship: Cultural Interests
as an Element of Self-Government
Though the trust relationship purports to respect the sovereignty
of Native American societies, its limitations impose serious obstacles
in the fair adjudication of land disputes.228 As the discussion above
indicates, the fiduciary duty currently obligates the federal
government to protect the right of self-government, viewed as strictly
political in nature.229 However, our courts have thus far failed to
recognize that Native American self-government, in order to survive,
must reestablish spiritual connections to aboriginal land.230 In the
case of the Onondaga, this connection has been tarnished by years
of environmental degradation by Honeywell, Clark, and Trigen.231
This section suggests that the strength of the Onondaga claim
lies within the common law trust doctrine, rather than the federal
Trade and Intercourse Act.232 The Onondaga Nation has the
opportunity to enforce the trust relationship to protect culturally and
spiritually significant lands from state and private intrusion. After
focusing on true intentions of the Onondaga regarding the five
treaties at issue in their litigation, the analysis below emphasizes the
political disruption caused by the treaties and the subsequent
obligations of the federal government.
A. The Onondaga’s True Intent
The Onondaga must initially establish a lack of mutual assent
and fairness in their negotiations with the State. The Nation can use
the visual representation of the wampum, as well as the textual
constitutional basis of Gayanashogowa, to assert the Onondaga’s
intention to preserve its system of government.
The Onondaga
must then emphasize that, under Gayanashogowa, maintaining
political sovereignty as an independent nation and member of the
Haudenosaunee required retaining ownership and control over
aboriginal land.
1. The Onondaga’s Status as a “Domestic Dependant Nation”
228 See supra text accompanying notes 184-94.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 105-10.
230 See The Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 125, at 4.
231 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1-2.
232 See supra text accompanying notes 147-53.
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Chief Justice John Marshall defined the federal government’s
role as “protecting” Native American tribes against intrusions by
states and private entities.233 Though this formulation is popularly
characterized as a “trust” relationship, it more closely resembles a
guardianship or paternalistic bond.234 The distinction at first seems
narrow, but it is in fact a critical shortcoming in our legal analysis of
Native American land claims.235 The approach taken by Marshall,
and followed in subsequent decisions, perpetuates the Lockean
misconception that Native American societies like the Onondaga
were weak and underdeveloped prior to European arrival.236
As described in Part II, the Onondaga, in the tradition of the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy, visually recorded dealings using
wampum beads.237 Belts constructed using wampum connote a
tribe’s true understanding of each interaction an understanding of
equal affiliation, peace, and friendship.238
The parallel beads
signifying “two paths or two vessels traveling down the same rivers
together” seem to indicate a perception much different from the
ward/guardian relationship envisioned by Justice Marshall.239
Regardless of whether they dealt with states, individuals, or directly
with the federal government, the Onondaga apparently viewed
themselves as the ultimate keepers of the land rather than a
“domestic dependant nation.”240
2. Transferring Alienable Title
Locke’s foundational belief that property ownership stems from
commercial production sharply contradicts the Haudenosaunee
conception that property should be held, in its natural state, for the
233 CWAG, supra note 198, at 6 (describing tribes as “extraconstitutional political
bodies”).
234 See Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831) (“[T]heir
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our
government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to
their wants; and address the President as their great father.”)
235 See id.
236 See supra text accompanying notes 105-10. Marshall’s words, cited in footnote
204, suggest that, although he believed Native American societies had some form of
government, it was insignificant in comparison to that of the “conqueror.” Johnson, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591.
237 Tully, supra note 105, at 177.
238 Id.
239 See Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 148.
240 Cherokee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
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“seventh generation.”241 Gayanashogowa, in its written form, states
that a visiting nation, using Haudenosaunee land, must never
interfere with a tribe’s relationship to the land.242 These words
indicate that the Onondaga perceived its treaties with the State of
New York as invitations of co-use, contingent on the visiting parties’
acceptance of its system of government and way of life.243 The
relationship between the original five nations of the Haudenosaunee
and the Tuscarora Nation, which joined the Confederacy in 1712,
exemplifies this
principle.244 Given the Onondaga’s deeply
embedded belief that land should be preserved, its seems unlikely
that the Nation would contemplate permanently transferring large
portions of their territory.245
Another key piece of evidence establishing the Onondaga’s lack
of intent to transfer title was their strong reliance on land for selfgovernment.246 The text of Gayanashogowa suggests that the
Haudenosaunee’s political system was synonymous with its cultural
and spiritual ties to land.247 Gayanashogowa’s significance stems
from the land it was founded upon.248
The land and all of its
physical characteristics was an integral part of each individual
nation’s identity, a notion which survived even the formation of the
Confederacy itself.249
References to living inhabitants and
resources establish that political strength was derived from natural
surroundings.250 Accordingly, control over land corresponded to
political power, the power of chiefs as trustees and women as the
ultimate holders of title.251
B. Extending and Enforcing the Trust Relationship
As stated in Part I, the Onondaga’s claim to nearly two million
acres of land under the Trade and Intercourse Act is contingent on
the federal district court’s adherence to a New York real property

241 See Tully, supra note 105, at 153.
242 The Constitution of the Five Nations, supra note 122, at 51.
243 See supra text accompanying note 141.
244 See Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 125.
245 See id.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 132-35.
247 See Haudenosaunee, supra note 125.
248 See id.
249 See Haudenosaunee, supra note 148.
250 Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 125.
251 See supra text accompanying note 134.
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recording statute.252 Though the 1788 treaty which transferred
most of the Onondaga’s land was recorded after the passing of the
1790 Trade and Intercourse Act, it was negotiated in 1788 and
purportedly reaffirmed a month prior to the Act’s enactment.253 In
the event the Court determines that the 1788 treaty does not fall
within the scope of the Trade and Intercourse Act, the Onondaga
must construct an alternative common law argument in support of
their land claim.254 This alternative presents a rare opportunity to
clarify and enforce the federal government’s fiduciary duty .
1. Use of the Canons of Construction for State/Tribal Treaties
Under the canons of construction, treaties which do not clearly
represent the tribe’s true intent and understanding at the time of
signing are construed as void.255 As discussed in Part III, the
canons currently apply to Native American treaties with the
Executive Branch and Congress.256 However, as a fiduciary, the
federal government is arguably under an obligation to ensure that all
treaties executed by the states comport with the same common law
contractual requirement of mutual assent.257
The federal
government’s acquiescence to the treaties made by the State of New
York impose a responsibility on the federal government to ensure
that these treaties were fairly executed.258 As established above,
the Onondaga did not intend to convey title to its land under the
treaties.259 Therefore, the canons of construction, though loosely
defined, provide a basis for enforcing the fiduciary duty and thereby
nullifying the 1788 treaty.
2. An Expansion of “Political” Protection: From Guardianship to
Gayanashogowa
In addition to using the canons of construction as a basis for
nullifying the 1788 treaty, the Nation can assert that the treaty
violated its inherent, residual sovereignty.
Under the current
252 See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
253 See Post Standard, supra note 42.
254 See id.
255 See Getches, supra note 166, at 200.
256 See CWAG, supra note 198, at 17.
257 See supra text accompanying notes 197-212.
258 See id.
259 See Haudenosaunee Confederacy, supra note 125.
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common law construction of the trust relationship, the federal
government’s fiduciary duty rests on protecting the political, rather
than cultural, sovereignty of tribes from the intrusion of states and
private parties.260 For that reason, a pressing concern in the
Onondaga case is whether the trust relationship can be enforced to
remedy environmental harms to culturally significant Native American
lands.261 The background discussed in this Note suggests that, in
order to trigger the federal government’s fiduciary duty, the cultural
harm inflicted on the Onondaga Nation must be characterized as an
infringement upon its right of tribal self-government.262
Since the common law fiduciary duty is intended to protect
Native American sovereignty in relation to the states, the Onondaga
must argue that their system of tribal government, Gayanashogowa,
is coexistent with their deep cultural affiliation with their land.263
Accordingly, the environmental degradation caused by private parties
and, indirectly, the State, constitutes a violation of the Onondaga’s
inherent, residual sovereignty.264
If successfully asserted, an established imposition on tribal selfgovernment obligates the federal government to intervene as a
fiduciary protecting the tribe’s political integrity against the State
and private parties.265 In an identical or intervening action, the
federal government’s argument would inevitably assert that the
established, constitutional basis of Gayanashogowa a political
system which predates European arrival on this continent trumps
state and private fee ownership of Onondaga territory.266 By
making this argument on the Onondaga’s behalf, the federal
government would acknowledge that the land at issue was governed
by a sophisticated, mature, and developed society.267
3.
The Remedy:
Using Declaratory Judgment to Force
Environmental Rehabilitation

260 See supra text accompanying note 211.
261 See id.
262 See id.
263 See Lepsch, supra note 158, at 8-9 (stating that the trust doctrine is a shield “to
protect tribes from the ever-encroaching fangs of the states.”)
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See supra text accompanying notes 139-49.
267 See id.
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Equating self-government with the environmental wellbeing of
aboriginal lands raises a subsequent common law option.268 The
Onondaga have stated that they do not intend to physically reoccupy
their aboriginal land.269 Rather, they aim to secure some power
over the cleanup of sacred areas such as Onondaga Lake.270
Accordingly, under Montana v. United States, the Onondaga have
the option of arguing that the conduct of the non-Indian entities,
such as the State and the named corporate defendants, threatens
the political integrity of the tribe.271 Thus, having established fee
title, the Onondaga fit squarely into the second exception presented
by the Supreme Court in Montana.272 This argument would allow
the Onondaga to exercise civil authority over the cleanup of
Onondaga Lake and other culturally significant areas.273
Alternatively, the Onondaga may once again hold the federal
government, as a fiduciary, responsible for ensuring that the land is
brought back to its natural state. As long as environmental
degradation infringes upon Onondaga self-government, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs is under a duty to adhere to the Onondaga Nation’s
standard for environmental restoration.
CONCLUSION
The Onondaga Nation’s land claim raises a novel challenge in
the area of federal-tribal and tribal-state relations. The fiduciary
duty, though intended to serve as a “shield” against state intrusion, is
fairly limited in scope. This Note suggests that any limitation can be
overcome through the use of historical evidence indicating a
correlation between culturally significant lands and tribal selfgovernment. Such evidence would not only expose the level of
harm suffered by tribes like the Onondaga, but would also highlight
the absence of mutual asset in land treaties executed by states and
private
Since
parties.
federal power over Native American affairs imposes a
duty upon the Executive Branch to protect residual, inherent tribal
sovereignty, it is imperative for tribes to characterize cultural ties to
land as creating unique political rights. As the Onondaga Nation
declares in its complaint, its relationship with the land extends
268 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
269 Complaint, supra note 1, at 7.
270 See id. at 6-7.
271 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
272 See id.
273 See id.
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beyond “ownership” or “possession.” Therefore, it is in the Nation’s
best interests to articulate the cultural and political injustice caused
by the dispossession and environmental degradation of its territory.

